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We introduce uncertainty into a pure exchange economy and establish a connection
between Shannon’s differential entropy and uniqueness of price equilibria. The
following conjecture is proposed under the assumption of a uniform probability
distribution: entropy is minimal if and only if the price is unique for every economy.
We show the validity of this conjecture for an arbitrary number of goods and two
consumers and, under certain conditions, for an arbitrary number of consumers
and two goods.
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1 Introduction
In a pure exchange economy let us denote by x = (p, ω) an initial allocation ω
and its supporting equilibrium price vector p. Suppose that x is slightly perturbed
by exogenous, i.e. shocks, or endogenous factors, e.g. the uncertainty related to
the effects of Safra’s competitive manipulation [19]. The result of this perturbation
is a new allocation and equilibrium price vector, x′, belonging to a neighborhood
N of x. We can represent this process as a probability model, where the random
variable ranges in the set N . Observe that N is not an Euclidean space. It belongs
to a space of endowments and prices and consists of points such that aggregate
excess demand function is equal to zero. Under standard smooth assumptions
and in a fixed total resource setting, N becomes a submanifold with boundary of
a manifold called the equilibrium manifold, denoted by E(r) which in turn is a
smooth submanifold of S×Ω(r), where S is the space of prices and Ω(r) the space
of economies (see the seminal work by Balasko [2] and also Section 2).
Thus E(r) can be equipped with a natural measure, namely the Riemannian
volume form dMg associated to the Riemannian metric g induced by the flat metric
of its ambient space S×Ω(r) (see e.g. [13]). The probability that x ∈ E(r) belongs
to N is




where p is a given probability density on E(r) (the reader is referred to [18] for
a geometric approach to probability theory on Riemannian manifolds). Moreover,
following Shannon [20] (see also [6]) in this framework we define the differential





Obviously when E(r) is an Euclidean flat space then one can take dMg equals to
the Lebesgue measure and H(N) is the differential entropy defined in [20].
Since entropy is a measure of missing information it is natural to investigate
under which conditions it is minimized. Therefore we provide he following:
Definition (MEP) The equilibrium manifold satisfies the minimal entropy prop-
erty (MEP) if for every economy x belonging to E(r), there exists a neighborhood
N of x in E(r) such that H(N) ≤ H(Ñ), where Ñ is any other submanifold of
S×Ω(r) containing x which has the same boundary of N and whose volume struc-
ture, in the same way as N , is induced by the flat metric of the ambient space
S × Ω(r).
It would be interesting (and challenging) to study how the choice of different
probability distributions affects the economic properties implied by (MEP). This
issue, which deserves further analysis, is beyond the scope of this paper.
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On the other hand, it is natural to restrict to the case of uniform distribution,





where V (N) =
∫
N
dMg(x) is the volume of N and χN : E(r) → {0, 1} is the









)dM(x) = log(V (N)), (1)
and so by the increasing property of the logarithm we deduce that in the case
of uniform distribution the (MEP) is equivalent to the following
Definition (MVP) The equilibrium manifold satisfies the minimal volume prop-
erty (MVP) if for every economy x belonging to E(r), there exists a neighborhood
N of x in E(r) such that V (N) ≤ V (Ñ), where Ñ is any other submanifold of
S × Ω(r) containing x which has the same boundary of N .
Now the (MVP) for E(r) can be translated into the language of differential
geometry: the equilibrium manifold E(r) is a stable minimal submanifold of S ×
Ω(r), i.e. a local minimum of the volume functional. In particular E(r) is a critical
point of the volume functional, namely E(r) is a minimal submanifold1of S×Ω(r).
Observe now that according to Theorem 2.1 below, if for every economy there
is uniqueness of equilibrium, the equilibrium manifold is “flat” (and hence mini-
mal): i.e., (global) uniqueness implies (MVP). Here we explore the reverse of this
implication: if there is price multiplicity, can (MVP) holds true? In other words,
does (MVP) implies uniqueness? This is not a trivial issue: in fact the equilibrium
manifold can almost arbitrarily be twisted for an appropriate preference profile2.
Hence one could expect to find an utility profile which gives rise to multiplicity
and minimality. Actually, we believe that exactly the opposite is true. Indeed we
address the following:
Conjecture: Under the assumption of uniform distribution the equilibrium man-
ifold satisfies (MEP) if and only if the equilibrium price is unique.
1Throughout this paper we will content ourselves with this definition since in the proof of
our main results we are not using the differential geometric machinery of the theory of minimal
submanifolds. The interested reader is referred to [21] for more details and material on minimal
submanifolds. The simplest examples of minimal submanifolds arise when n = 1: in this case
they are simply geodesics of the ambient space. In higher dimensions every totally geodesic
submanifold is a minimal submanifold (cf. also [11] for some properties of geodesics and totally
geodesic submanifolds of the equlibrium manifold). Nevertheless, there exist a lot of interesting
minimal submanifolds (see [21] or Section 3 below).
2Even if the equilibrium manifold E(r) is unknotted in its ambient space [7].
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In other words, we believe that an utility profile which minimizes entropy (and
hence volume) with uniform distribution is incompatible with price multiplicity.
In this paper we show the validity of this conjecture in the case of an arbi-
trary number of goods and two consumers (Theorem 3.1) and in the case of an
arbitrary number of consumers and two goods (Theorem 4.1) under the additional
assumption that the normal vector field of E(r) is constant outside a compact
subset of the ambient space. The proof of Theorem 3.1 strongly relies on geo-
metric and economic properties: the classification of ruled minimal submanifolds
of the Euclidean space, the bundle structure of the equilibrium manifold and the
positiveness of prices. On the other hand, the proof of Theorem 4.1 combines deep
geometric results relating the topology of a minimal submanifold of the Euclidean
space with the fact that E(r) is globally diffeomorphic to an Euclidean space.
It is worth noticing that the choice of a metric depends on the analysis. In
[12] the metric on the equilibrium manifold was chosen to deal with asymptotic
properties related to economies with an arbitrarily large number of equilibria. In
[13] the metric used was a tool to explore geometric properties which are intrinsic,
i.e. they do not depend on the ambient space. But the purpose, and the approach,
of the present work is entirely different and this affects the choice of the metric
used.
We believe that this information-theoretic and geometric approach can be fur-
ther extended in different directions. Following the seminal contribution by [22]
(see also [4, 5] and [15]), an entropy-based metric could be developed in order
to compute geodesics representing redistributive policies. Another direction of
research (see [19] and [9]) is to analyze the extrinsic uncertainty in N ⊂ E(r)
caused by coalitional manipulation of endowments. This approach could provide
new insights into the understanding of coalition formation and sunspot equilibria.
Finally, due to the economic relevance of the shape of the equilibrium manifold, it
can be worth investigating the connection between its shape and the primitives of
the model, an issue still largely unexplored. This local-global view can hopefully
lead to new perspectives on issues like uniqueness and stability (see [10, 16] for a
survey).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recalls notations, definitions and
the existing results which will be used to prove our main results. Section 3 and
Section 4 prove our main results, Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1.
2 Definitions
The economic setup is represented by a pure exchange smooth economy with L
goods and M consumers under the standard smooth assumptions (see [2, Chapter
4
2]). The set of normalized prices is defined by
S = {p = (p1, . . . pL) ∈ R
L | pl > 0, l = 1, . . . , L, pL = 1}
and the set Ω = (RL)M denotes the space of endowments ω = (ω1, . . . , ωM),
ωi ∈ R








where fi(p, wi) is consumer’s i demand.
By [2, Lemma 3.2.1], E is a (closed) smooth submanifold of S × Ω, globally dif-
feomorphic to S × RM × R(L−1)(M−1) = RLM , i.e. φ|E ∼= R
LM , where the smooth
mapping
φ : S × Ω → S × RM × R(L−1)(M−1)
is defined by
(p, ω1 . . . , ωM) 7→ (p, p · ω1, . . . , p · ωM , ω̄1, . . . , ω̄M−1),
where ω̄i denotes the first L− 1 components of ωi, for i = 1, . . . ,M − 1.
We also introduce the following two subsets of E:
• the set of no-trade equilibria T = {(p, ω) ∈ E| fi(p, p·ωi) = ωi, i = 1, . . . ,M};
• the fiber associated with (p, w1, . . . , wM) ∈ S × R
M , which is defined as the
set of pairs (p, ω) ∈ S × Ω such that:






By defining the two smooth maps
f : S × RM → S × RLM ,
where f(p, w1, . . . , wM) = (p, f1(p, w1), . . . , fM(p, wM)), and
φFiber : E → S × R
M ,
where φFiber(p, ω1, . . . , ωM) = (p, p ·ω1, . . . , p ·ωM), since f(S×R
M) = T ⊂ E and
φFiber ◦ f is the identity mapping, by applying [2, Lemma 3.2.1], Balasko shows [2,
Proposition 3.3.2] that T is a smooth submanifold of E diffeomorphic to S ×RM .
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By construction, every fiber associated with (p, w1, . . . , wM) is a subset of E
which is the inverse image of (p, w1, . . . , wM) via the mapping φFiber. It is intu-
itively clear that while holding (p, w1, . . . , wM) fixed and letting ω varying along
the fiber, there are not any nonlinearities which may arise from the aggregate de-
mand. In fact the fiber is a linear submanifold of E of dimension (L− 1)(M − 1)
[2, Proposition 3.4.2].
Since every fiber contains only one no-trade equilibrium [2, Proposition 3.4.3],
the equilibrium manifold E can be thought as a disjoint union of fibers parametrized
by the no-trade equilibria T via the mapping φ|E : E → S × R
M × R(L−1)(M−1):
for a fixed (p, w1, . . . , wM) ∈ S × R
M , each fiber is parametrized by ω̄1, . . . , ω̄M−1.
By letting (p, w1, . . . , wM) varying in S × R
M , we obtain the bundle structure of
the equilibrium manifold.
If total resources are fixed, the equilibrium manifold is defined as
E(r) = {(p, ω) ∈ S × Ω(r) |
M∑
i=1
fi(p, p · ωi) = r}, (3)
where r ∈ RL is the vector that represents the total resources of the economy and
Ω(r) = {ω ∈ RLM |
∑M
i=1 ωi = r}.
Let




fi(p, wi) = r} (4)
be the set of price-income equilibria (see [2, Definition 5.1.1]). B(r) is a sub-
manifold of S × RM diffeomorphic to RM−1 [2, Corollary 5.2.4] through the map
θ : S × RM → RL × RM−1, defined by
(p, w) 7→ (
∑
i
fi(p, wi), u1(f1(p, w1), . . . , uM−1(fM−1(p, wM−1)). (5)
The equilibrium manifold E(r) is a submanifold of S × Ω(r) diffeomorphic to
R
L(M−1) [2, Corollary 5.2.5]
φ(E(r)) = B(r)× R(L−1)(M−1). (6)
Moreover we can define and T (r) = T ∩ S × Ω(r). By construction, even in a
fixed total resource setting, the equilibrium manifold preserves its bundle structure
property and, hence, E(r) can be written as the disjoint union
E(r) = ⊔x∈T (r)Fx, (7)
where Fx is an (L− 1)(M − 1)-affine subspace of R
L(M−1).
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Let t = (t1, . . . , tl−1), ω̄j = (ω
1
1, . . . , ω
l−1
1 ) and p(t) = (p1(t), . . . , pl−1(t). Fol-
lowing [2] and [13], we can parametrize B(r) via the map:
ϕ : RM−1 → B(r), t → (p(t), w1(t) . . . , wm−1(t)) (8)
and E(r) via the map:
Φ : RL(M−1) → E(r), (9)
(t, ω11, . . . , ω
1
M−1, . . . , ω
1
1, . . . , ω
L−1
M−1) 7→ (p(t), ω̄1, w1(t)−p(t)·ω̄1, . . . , wM−1(t)−p(t)·ω̄M−1)
We end this section with the following result due to Balasko, deeply related to
the issue raised in this paper.
Theorem 2.1 [2, p. 188 Theorem 7.3.9 part (2)] If for every ω ∈ Ω(r) there is
uniqueness of equilibrium, the equilibrium correspondence is constant: The equi-
librium price vector p associated with ω does not depend on ω.
Remark 2.2 Hence (global) uniqueness implies (MEP) for E(r) under the as-
sumption of a uniform distribution. This theorem will be used to prove the “only
if” part of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.1.
3 The case M = 2
In this section we prove the following:
Theorem 3.1 Let M = 2 and assume a uniform distribution. Then E(r) satisfies
the (MEP) if and only if the price is unique.
Before proving the theorem we need some definitions.
• a submanifold Mn ⊂ Rn+k is said to be ruled if Mn is foliated by affine
subspaces of dimension n− 1 in Rn+k.
• a generalized helicoid is the ruled submanifold Mn(a1, . . . , ak, b) ⊂ R
n+k,
k ≤ n, admitting the following parametrization:
(s, t1, . . . , tn−1) 7→ (t1 cos(a1s), t1 sin(a1s), . . . , tk cos(aks), tk sin(aks), tk+1, . . . , tn−1, bs)),
where aj, j = 1, . . . , k, and b are real numbers (we are not escluding that one
of these coefficients could vanish and the generalized helicoid becomes an affine
subspace).
The key ingredient in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is the following classification
result on ruled minimal submanifolds of the Euclidean space. We refer the reader
to [8, Section 1] and references therein (in particular [14] for a proof).
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Theorem 3.2 ([14]) A minimal ruled submanifold Mn ⊂ Rn+k is, up to rigid
motions3 of Rn+k, a generalized helicoid.
We need also the following simple but fundamental fact:
Lemma 3.3 Let Mn(a1, . . . , ak, b) ⊂ R
n+k be a generalized helicoid such that b ·∏k
i=1 ai 6= 0. Then M
n intersects any affine hyperplane of Rn+k.
Proof: In cartesian coordinates x1, y1, . . . , xk, yk, xk+1, . . . , xn−1, xn an hyperplane
of Rn+k has equation:
α1x1 + β1y1 + · · ·+ αkxk + βkyk + αk+1xk+1 + · · ·+ αn−1xn−1 + αnxn = δ,









On the other hand the following equation represents the condition to be satis-
fied for a point of the hyperplane to belong to the generalized helicoid:
k∑
i=1
ti(αi cos(ais) + βi sin(ais)) +
n−1∑
j=k+1
αjtj + αnbs = δ.
Since one can always find a pair (s0, t0) satisfying the previous equation, the lemma
is proved. 
Proof of Theorem 3.1: Since (MEP) is equivalent to (MVP), E(r) is a minimal
submanifold of S × Ω(r). Since M = 2, by the bundle structure property (see (7)
above) E(r) is a ruled submanifold in R2L−1. By Theorem 3.2, E(r) is (up to rigid
motions) a generalized helicoid. If some ai or b are equal to zero then E(r) is an
hyperplane and, by Theorem 2.1, the price is unique. Otherwise if b ·
∏
i ai 6= 0,
by combining Lemma 3.3 with the fact that E(r) is contained in the open set of
R
2L−1 consisting of those points with p > 0 (p being the price) one deduces that
E(r) is an affine hyperplane and so the price is unique. The “only if” part follows
by Theorem 2.1 (see Remark 2.2). 
3A rigid motion of the Euclidean space Rl is an isometry of Rl given by the composition of
an orthogonal l × l matrix and a translation by some vector v ∈ Rl.
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Remark 3.4 In the previous theorem we use the fact that E(r) ⊂ S × Ω(r)
is a minimal submanifold We can prove the same result by only assuming that
the no-trade equilibria T (r) (which is one dimensional for M = 2) is a minimal
submanifold of E(r), namely it is a geodesic. Indeed, by using the diffeomorphism
between T (r) and B(r), and the parametrization Φ of E(r) (see (9)), T (r) can be
parametrized through Φ by letting v = 0:
Φ(t, 0) = γ(t).
Hence, if T (r) is a geodesic in E(r), its acceleration γ′′(t) is parallel, for every t,
to the unit normal vector N(t)|v=0 of E(r) or, equivalently, γ
′′(t) ∧ N(t)|v=0 = 0.
We have γ′′(t) = β′′(t) = (p̈, 0, ẅ) and, since v = 0, Φt ∧Φv = β̇ ∧ δ = (−ẇ, pṗ, ṗ).
Hence γ′′(t) ∧N(t)|v=0 = β
′′ ∧ (β′ ∧ δ) = 0 if and only if
(−pṗẅ, pp̈+ ẇẅ, pṗp̈) = (0, 0, 0).
This implies that, for every t, ṗp̈ = 0, i.e. (ṗṗ)′ = 0, hence p is (constant and)
unique.
4 The case L = 2
In this section we consider an economy with two goods and an arbitrary number
of consumers. In this case the equilibrium manifold is a hypersurface. More
precisely, the equilibrium manifold E(r) has dimension R2M−2 and the ambient
space has dimension R2M−1. So it makes sense to consider the normal vector field
N along E(r), namely for each x ∈ E(r) we consider a unit vector N(x) parallel
to the affine line TxX
⊥ normal to the tangent space TxX of X at x. The smooth
map N : E(r) → S2M−2 which takes x to the point N(x) of the unit sphere
S2M−2 ⊂ R2M−1 is called the Gauss map. Obviously, if the Gauss map is constant
then the price is constant and hence E(r) is an affine hyperplane in R2M−1. In
the following theorem, which represents the second main result of the paper, we
show that the minimality assumption together with the constancy of the Gauss
map outside a compact set imply uniqueness of the equilibrium price.
Theorem 4.1 Let L = 2. Assume that the Gauss map is constant outside a com-
pact subset of E(r). Under the assumption of uniform distribution, E(r) satisfies
(MEP) if and only if the price is unique.
This theorem can be intepreted by saying that if the equilibrium manifold is
minimal and there exists a compact subset K of R2M−1 such that (R2M−1 \K) ∩
E(r) is the union of open subsets of hyperplanes each parallel to the hyperplane
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p = const, then E(r) is indeed an hyperplane. As a consequence, the usual one-










The proof of Theorem 4.1 relies on the following theorem obtained in turn by
suitably combining some deep results obtained by Anderson in [1].
Theorem 4.2 Let Mn ⊂ Rn+1, n > 2, be a minimal hypersurface such that the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. Mn has one end;
2. Mn is a C1-diffeomorphic to a compact manifold M̄n punctured at a finite
number of points {pi}.
3. the Gauss map N : Mn → Sn extends to a C1-map of M̄n.
Then Mn is an affine n-plane.
Remark 4.3 The number of ends of a smooth manifold is a topological invariant
which, roughly speaking, measures the number of connected components “at in-
finity”. The reader is referred to [1] for a rigorous definition. What we are going
to use in the proof of Theorem 4.1 is that for n > 1, the Euclidean space Rn has
only one end. This is because Rn \K has only one unbounded component for any
compact set K.
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Since (MEP) is equivalent to (MVP), E(r) is a minimal
submanifold of S × Ω(r). If M = 2 we can apply Theorem 3.1. We can then
assume M > 2 and so dimE(r) = 2M − 2 > 2. Hence, in order to prove the “if”
part it is enough to verify that the three conditions of Theorem 4.2 are satisfied for
E(r) ⊂ R2M−1. Condition 1 follows by the previous remark, since E(r) is globally
diffeomorphic to R2M−2. Notice that the unit sphere S2M−2 is the Alexandroff
compactification of E(r) ∼= R2M−2, namely it can be obtained by adding one
point, called ∞, to E(r). In other words E(r) is diffeomorphic to the sphere
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S2M−2 punctured to ∞ and so also condition 2 holds true. The assumption that
the Gauss map N : E(r) → S2M−2 is constant outside a compact set K means that
N(x) = N0, whereN0 is a fixed vector in S
2M−2, for all x ∈ E(r)\K. Therefore, one
can extend N to a C∞-map N̂ : S2M−2 → S2M−2 by simply defining N̂(∞) = N0,
and so also condition 3 is satisfied. The “only if” part follows by Theorem 2.1 (see
Remark 2.2). 
Remark 4.4 Given a submanifold Mn of a Riemannian manifold Nn+k, one can
express the minimality condition in terms of the vanishing of the mean curvature
H. If k = 1, namely whenMn is an hypersurface, the minimality condition, namely
H = 0 , is equivalent to the vanishing of the trace of the differential of the Gauss
map (see e.g. [3]). Thus, for L = 2 one could try to show that minimality of E(r)
implies uniqueness of the equiilbrium price without imposing the extra condition
on the constancy of the Gauss map outside a compact set (as in Theorem 4.1) by
computing the Gauss map through the parametrization (9) above and imposing
that the vanishing of the trace of its differential. This gives rise to a complicated
PDE equation, which the authors were not able to handle even when M = 3.
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